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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant seeks to reverse the District Court's 
denial of Appellant's Motion to Alter Judgment denying her 
Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After a hearing on April 21, 1977, in the Small 
Claims Court of Murray City, Respondent in this case, a j ud1 
rnent was entered in the matter of State of Utah v. Rose Mar. 
Hurne against Appellant. Appellant's counsel, who appeared 
at the hearing, first learned of the adverse judgment from 
the plaintiff in that matter on July 1, 1977. Appellant ha1 
never received notice of the judgment from Respondent. On 
the next working day, Appellant's counsel mailed Appellant' 
Notice of Appeal from the judgment to Respondent. The Noti 
of Appeal was filed in Respondent Court on July 7, 1977. 
Respondent court refused, however, to forward the Notice of 
Appeal to the District Court, stating that it was untimely, 
and claiming to have sent notice of entry of judgment to 
Appellant on May 2, 1977. Appellant petitioned the Distric 
Court for a Writ of Mandamus to compel Respondent to forwar 
the Notice of Appeal. This Petition was denied. Appellant 
then made a timely Motion to Alter Judgment, under Rule 591 
U.R.C.P., on the grounds that, as a matter of law, insuffi· 
cient evidence was presented at the hearing on the Petitior 
to justify a decision that Respondent sent Appellant noticf 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of entry of judgment. That Motion also was denied, on the 
grounds that it was improper procedure. 
QUESTIONS TO BE DECIDED 
1. Was the Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter Judgment 
a proper procedure to employ? 
2. Does Appellant have a constitutional right to 
notice of entry of judgment from Small Claims Court? 
3. Does Appellant have a statutory right to notice 
of entry of judgment from Small Claims court? 
4. Was there insufficient evidence as a matter 
of law to establish that Respondent sent Appellant notice of 
entry of judgment? 
ARGUMENT 
I APPELLANT'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT UNDER RUL~ 
59(e) WAS THE PROPER PROCEDURE TO EMPLOY. 
Rule 59(e), U.R.C.P., provides: "A motion to alter 
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days 
after entry of the judgment." A motion under this rule is 
the proper procedure to use to seek to vacate a judgment. 
Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976). In finding the 
motion in Nichols untimely, this court stated, "After an order 
of dismissal, the plaintiff must move under Rules 59(e) or 
60(b) to reopen the judgment." 554 P.2d at 232. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 59 (e) is identical to Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e). Federal cases under that rule 
are instructive as to the proper use of a motion to alter 
-2-
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judgment. In American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Planned 
Marketing Assoc., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1974), 
the court had dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdict 
The plaintiff filed a Rule 59(e) motion requesting the com 
to vacate its order on the grounds that the dismissal was 
"contrary to law." In response to this motion, the court 
stated: 
Defendants point out that plaintiff's motion 
to vacate and set aside the court's previous 
order is, in reality, merely an appeal from 
that order. Defendants concede, however, 
that Rule 59(e) is available to a movant who 
seeks to have an order vacated. 11 Wright & 
Miller Fed. Practice & Procedure, §2804 (1973); 
6A Moore, Fed. Practice, para. 59,12[1] (1974). 
389 F. Supp. at 1144. 
The court, holding the motion proper, proceeded to conside1 
it on its merits. 
Here, as in American Family Life, Appellant move( 
the District court under Rule 59 (e) to alter judgment on t! 
grounds the court's judgment was contrary to law. In hold: 
the procedure improper, the District Court erred in its 
interpretation of Rule 59(e). Appellant's Motion should~ 
considered on its merits. 
Spatz v. Mascone, 368 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. Pa. 197 
explained the origins and breadth of Rule 59(e). There, 
plaintiff moved the court under Rule 59 (e) to vacate its o 
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. In hold 
that the plaintiff's motion was proper, the court quoted a 
length from Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship C};; 
303 F.2d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 1962): 
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Rule 59 has been properly described as 'an 
amalgamation of the motion for new trial at 
common law and the petition for rehearing in 
equity adapted to the unified procedure ..• ' 
6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1953) para. 
59.02, at 3707. Of course, technically there 
is no trial when summary judgment is granted. 
But even before Rule 59 was amended in 1946 
to add subsection Ce}, specifically providing 
for motions to alter or amend a judgment, the 
original provision of the Rule authorizing a 
party to move for a new trial within ten days 
after judgment was construed by several courts 
as broad enough to include motions for recon-
sideration of orders finally disposing of action 
before trial. {Citations omitted.] Since the 
addition of subsection (e) the courts which have 
considered the problem seem to have experienced 
no d~fficulty in concluding that a motion for 
rehearing or reconsideration, made within ten 
days after the entry of an appealable order 
is within the coverage of Rule 59. 368 F. Supp. 
at 353. (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant's Motion, essentially a motion for recon-
sideration, timely made, is within the coverage of Rule 59(e), 
was proper, and therefore should be con?idered on its merits. 
II APPELLANT'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT SHOULD 
BE GRANTED. 
A. PETITIONER HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO APPEAL THE JUDGMENT OF THE SMALL 
CLAIMS COURT AND THUS HAS A CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT TO NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT, WHICH SHE WAS DENIED. 
Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution 
provides in relevant part: "Appeals shall also lie from the 
final judgment of justices'of the peace in civil and criminal 
cases to the District Courts on both questions of law and 
fact, and with such limitations and restrictions as shall be 
provided by law." As held in Salt Lake City, v. Peters, 22 Utah 
2d 127, 449 P.2d 652 (1969), this constitutional right to 
-4-
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appeal extends to appeals from city courts as well as from 
justices of the peace. 
Under U.C.A. §78-6-1, small claims courts are a 
department of city courts and justice courts. Therefore th1 
right to appeal city and justice courts' decisions under th1 
Utah Constitution extends also to small claims courts. 
Since Appellant has a constitutional right to ap~ 
the decision of the small claims court, she also has the 
right, under the Due Process Clauses of the Utah and United 
States Constitutions, to notice of her right to appeal. As 
stated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust co., 339 
U.S. 306, 314 (1950): 
"The fundamental requisite of due process of 
law is the opportunity to be heard." Grannis 
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394. This right to 
be heard has little reality or worth unless 
one is informed that the matter is pending and 
can choose for himself whether to appear or 
default, acquiesce or contest. 
In the present case, Appellant was not informed t 
judgment was entered in Respondent Small Claims court. As 
will be explained more fully below, under U.C.A. §78-6-10, 
a dissatisfied defendant in small claims court has five d~ 
from notice of entry of judgment to appeal to the district 
court. Since Appellant had no notice of the entry of judg· 
ment in the Small Claims Court, she was not informed when 
the appeal period began. Lacking this information, she wa~ 
unable to file an appeal. Because the lack of notice deni' 
Appellant her constitutional right to appeal, she was den~ 
her constitutional right to due process. 
-5-
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provides: 
B. PETITIONER HAS A STATUTORY RIGHT TO 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN SMALL 
CLAIMS COURT UNDER u.c.A. §§78-6-10 
AND 78-6-11 AND RULE 73 (_h), WHICH SHE 
WAS DENIED. 
U.C.A. §78-6-10, referring to small claims courts, 
The judgment of said court shall be conclusive 
upon the plaintiff unless a counterclaim has 
been interposed. If the defendant is dissatis-
fied, he may, within five days from the entry 
of said judgment against him, appeal to the 
district court of the county in which said court 
is held ••.. 
This section does not mention the right to notice of the 
entry of judgment. Nevertheless, U.C.A. §78-6-11, U.R.C.P. 
Rule 73(h), and Utah case law make it clear that §78-6-10 
contemplates the defendant's receiving notice of entry of 
judgment to mark the beginning of the appeal period. 
U.C.A. §78-6-11, referring to small claims courts, 
provides, "The appeal shall be in the same manner as appeals 
generally from a city or justice court." U.R.C.P. Rule 73(h) 
provides: 
An appeal may be taken to the district court 
from a final judgment rendered in a city or 
justice court within one month after notice 
of the entry of such judgment, or within 
such shorter time as may be provided by law •... 
(_Emphasis added.) 
When these two provisions are read together, two points emerge. 
(1) Appeals from small claims courts are governed by the five-
day period. This period is consistent with the legislature's 
power under Rule 73(h) to provide for a shorter appeal period 
than thirty days from city or justice court, of which small 
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claims court is a department under §78-6-1. ( 2 } The appeal 
period from small claims court commences upon notice of entr 
of judgment to the defendant. This notice requirement is 
clear, since (a} appeal from small claims court is taken u 
the same manner as appeals generally from city or justice 
court, and (bl the appeal period from city or justice cour: 
of which small claims court is a department, begins upon 
notice of entry of judgment. 
If a dissatisfied defendant in small claims court 
such as Appellant, receives no notice of entry of judgment, 
there can be no time limit for the filing of appeal, since 
the appeal period cannot start without that notice. There· 
fore, Appellant's appeal should not be time-barred, since 
the statutory period for filing had not been started by 
Respondent giving Appellant notice of entry of an adverse 
judgment in Respondent court. 
Utah case law under current and former statutes 
supports this interpretation of the notice requirement. Tl 
most recent case, Larson Ford Sales, Inc. v. Silver, 551 p, 
233 (Utah 1976), upheld §78-6-10 against an equal protecti1 
challenge, made on the basis that an appellant from small 
claims court has only five days to appeal, rather than one 
month as from city and justice court. Implicit in that ca 
is that notice of the entry of judgment is required to beg 
the appeal period from small claims court. This Court sta 
" [A] s an appellant from the small claims court he is allo~ 
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only five days within which to file his notice of appeal, 
whereas appeals from city and district court judgments may 
be made within one month." 551 P.2d at 233. This court 
recognized the distinction between appeals from city and 
from small claims courts as between the time periods only 
and not in the right to notice of entry of judgment to start 
the appeal period. 
Forsythe v. Third Judicial Dist. Ct., 41 Utah 16, 
123 P.621, 623 (1912), decided under Comp. Laws of 1907, 
§3744, a predecessor of Rule 73(h), explained the purpose 
of the notice requirement: 
Its purpose manifestly is to apprise the 
losing party of the time the judgment was 
entered against him in the action, so as to 
give him ample opportunity to take an appeal 
to the district court .... The primary ob-
ject of the service of the notice, therefore, 
is to set in motion the 30-day period within 
which an appeal must be taken, and to leave 
no room for doubt that the losing party has 
had notice of when that period begins and ends. 
It is inconceivable that the Utah Legislature would retain 
the notice requirement for appellants from city and justice 
courts, yet abandon the fair-minded purposes behind the notice 
requirement for the less advantaged appellants from small 
claims court, who have a much shorter appeal period. 
Further, a denial of right to notice of entry of 
judgment would clearly be a denial of equal protection, as 
well as a denial of due process as explained supra. Although 
the shorter appeal period has been held not a denial of equal 
protection in Larson Ford Sales, Inc. v. Silver, supra, that 
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case did not address the issue of whether small claims cou1 
appellants could be denied notice of entry of judgment con· 
sistent with the Equal Protection Clause. It may be reasor 
able, considering the nature and purpose of small claims 
court, to provide a shorter appeal period; nothing in the 
nature and purpose of small claims court, however, justifi1 
denying appellants the opportunity to know when the appeal 
period begins and ends and thus the opportunity to file 
timely appeals from adverse judgments. 
The appeal period dates from the notice of entry 
judgment. In the absence of this notice, the appeal perio1 
cannot run. Therefore, in the circumstances of this case, 
the appeal cannot be time-barred. Here, the judgment was 
entered against Appellant in Respondent Court on May 2, 19 
Appellant was not given notice of the entry of judgment pr 
to July 1, 1977, when Appellant's counsel received notice 
from the other party to the judgment, the plaintiff in §.!! 
of Utah v. Rose Marie Hume. On the next working day Appel 
lant's counsel mailed the Notice of Appeal, which was file 
in Respondent Court on July 7, 1977. Appellant thus compl 
with the app~al .procedure as rapidly as possible in the cl 
cumstances. In similar circumstances, this court has held 
an appeal not time-barred. In Bullen v. Anderson, 81 Utah 
151, 17 P.2d 213, 215 (1932), decided under an earlier 
statute allowing filing of the notice of appeal within 
thirty days of notice of entry of judgment, this Court hel 
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[T]he time for taking an appeal dated from 
notice of the entry of judgment, not from the 
date of the entry of the judgment ..•• In the 
absence of notice of the entry of judgment, an 
appeal taken more than six months after its 
entry is in due time notwithstanding the judg-
ment debtor may have had actual knowledge of 
its entry. 
Under Bullen, Appellant's appeal was filed in due time. There-
fore, that appeal should be heard. 
C. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENT 
SENT APPELLANT NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
At the hearing in the District Court on Appellant's 
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to compel Respondent to for-
ward the Notice of Appeal, Respondent produced a copy of a 
letter that it claimed it had mailed to Appellant giving 
notice of entry of judgment. This evidence is insufficient 
as a matter of law to justify a decision that Respondent sent 
or Appellant received notice of the entry of judgment. 
1. TO RAISE A PRESUMPTION IN FACT OF 
RECEIPT OF A LETTER, THERE MUST BE 
PROOF OF MAILING THE LETTER PROPERLY 
ADDRESSED WITH POSTAGE PREPAID. 
When a party attempts to prove that another person 
received a letter in the mail, courts engage in a presumption 
of fact that if the letter is proved to be properly addressed 
and mailed, the letter was received by the addressee. That 
is the rule in Utah, as stated by this Court in Campbell v. 
Gowans, 35 Utah 268, 100 P.397 (1909), and Brown v. Fraternal 
Accident Ass'n of America, 18 Utah 265, 55 P.63 (1898). It 
is important to keep in mind that proof of mailing is an 
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antecedent to application of the presumption. As stated 
in Suits v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America 
139 Minn. 246, 166 N.W. 222, 223 (1918), "The presumption 
that a properly mailed letter will reach the person to whom 
addressed has application only when the act of mailing is 
unquestioned or conclusively established." (Emphasis added 
In Suits, the court affirmed the trial court's finding of 
non-receipt, holding that proof of mailing was not conclusi 
despite (1) subsequent action by the alleged addressee 
consistent with receipt of the letter; (2) a stipulation c 
facts by the parties that a witness would testify to the 
preparation of the letter, enclosure in a properly addresse 
envelope, including postage and return address, non-return 
of the letter, and while no particular recollection of mail 
the letter, belief of mailing from habit and custom; (3) a 
further stipulation that the person who allegedly mailed tl 
letter was methodical; and (4) the fact that after the ser 
death, the letter was not found among his papers. 
2. MERE PROOF OF WRITING A LETTER DOES 
NOT RAISE AN INFERENCE OF MAILING SO 
AS TO RAISE THE PRESUMPTION OF RECEIPT 
In the present case, the only evidence that the 
notice of Respondent's judgment was sent to Appellant was 
a copy of the letter claimed to have been mailed. Such a 
showing is insufficient to raise an inference of mailing s· 
as to raise the presumption of receipt. In Jacobs v. Nati· 
Accident and Health Insurance Company, 103 Vt. 5, 151 A. 5 
566 (1930), the court stated: 
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All that appears is that such a letter 
is written. It is not shown that it ever 
found its way into the mails. It is to be 
remembered that it is the mailing of a 
letter that raises the so-called presump-
tion that it was ever received by the add-
ressee •••. But it would be going too far, 
we think to say that evidence that a letter 
was "written" implies that it was deposited 
in the post office, properly stamped and 
addressed. It was held in Uhlman v. A & 5 
Brewing Co. (C.C.) 53 F. 485, that the 
mailing of a letter will not be presumed 
from the fact that it was written. To the 
same effect are National Building Associa-
tion v. Quin, 120 Ga. 358, 47 S.E. 962; 
Best v. German Ins. Co., 68 Mo. App. 598; 
Bankers' Mutual Cas. Co. v. People's Bank, 
127 Ga. 326, 56 S.E. 429; and Sills v. Burge, 
141 Mo. App. 148, 124 S.W. 605. 
To the same effect is James E. Cashman v. Spellman, 
233 App. Div. 45, 48, 251 N.Y.S. 240 (1931), which also held 
it error for the trial court to have admitted a copy of a 
letter in evidence without proof of mailing, which allegedly 
occurred "in the ordinary course of business." 
On these grounds, in the present case no inference 
of mailing of the notice of the judgment should have arisen, 
and therefore Respondent could not avail itself of the pre-
sumption of receipt, which only flows from proof of the 
proper mailing. 
3. THE PRESUMPTION OF RECEIPT THAT ARISES 
FROM PROOF OF PROPER MAILING IS A 
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF FACT, AND 
DENIAL OF RECEIPT CREATES A CONFLICT IN 
THE EVIDENCE TO BE RESOLVED BY THE TRIER 
OF FACT. 
Brown v. Fraternal Accident Ass'n of America, supra, 
66, established the rule in Utah that "the presumption of fact 
raised by the proof that the notice was sent by mail was a 
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circumstance, when opposed by a denial of the receipt of ti 
letter, to be weighed by the jury with all the other evidet 
in determining the question whether or not the letter was 
actually received.u That is, the presumption of fact is 
rebut table. In Campbell, supra, the presumption was in fac 
successfully rebutted by denial of receipt, coupled with 
action inconsistent with receipt. The fact situation in 
Suits, supra, is also relevant, since the court upheld a 
finding of non-receipt there in the face of a much stronge: 
showing of mailing than was made by Respondent in the pres1 
case. 
4. THE PARTY ASSERTING RECEIPT OF A 
LETTER HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING 
ITS RECEIPT. 
·In Huntley v. Whittier, 105 Mass. 391, 392-93 
7 Am. Rep. 536, (1870), the court stated, "the burden of 
proving its receipt remains throughout upon the party who 
asserts it." This rule accords with the basic rule of fE 
ness in the law of evidence that a party should not be for 
to prove a negative, e.g., that a letter was not mailed or 
received. As the court stated in Palicka v. Ruth Fisher 
School Dist. No. 90 of Maricopa county, 13 Ariz. App. 5, 
473 P.2d 807, 811 (1970), "It is the genera~ rule that t~ 
party asserting the affirmative of an issue has the burder 
of proving it." To the same effect are Firkins v. Affolt1 
504 P.2d 365 (Colo. App. 1972); and Carter v. Burn constr 
Co., Inc., 85 N.M. 27, 508 P.2d 1324 (1973). This rule 
is especially salutary in a case such as the present, whe 
the party asserting the affirmative had physical control 
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the subject matter and thus personal knowledge available as 
to the handling of the letter. 
Since in the present case Respondent has not pre-
sented competent evidence to uphold its burden, Appellant 
should be found not to have received notice of the judgment 
more than five days before filing her Notice of Appeal. 
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the District Court 
to issue a Writ of Mandamus to compel Respondent to forward 
Appellant's Notice of Appeal to the District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent has produced insufficient evidence as 
a matter of law to support a finding that Respondent sent 
or Appellant received notice of entry of judgment. Under 
the Utah constitution Appellant has a right to notice of 
entry of judgment. Appellant also has a statutory right to 
notice of entry of judgment. Therefore the District Court's 
denial of a Writ of Mandamus to compel Respondent to forward 
the Notice of Appeal was improper. Further, the denial of 
Appellant's Motion to Alter the Judgment denying the Writ, 
on the basis that that Motion was improper procedure, was an 
error of law. 
Wherefore, Appellant prays that this court: 
1. Enter its Judgment that Appellant's Motion to 
Alter Judgment was proper procedure and that the evidence .to 
support a finding that Respondent sent, or Appellant received, 
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not~ce of entry of judgment was insufficient as a matter 
of law. 
2. Reverse the District Court's denial of Appel 
lant's Motion and order the District Court to issue a Writ 
of Mandamus to compel Respondent to forward Appellant's 
Notice of Appeal. 
DATED this ~ day of 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By Lucy Billings 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and cor~ 
copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to H. Craig Hall, I 
Attorney for Respondent, 5461 South State Street, Murray, 
Utah 84107. 
DATED this --1.£.!:_ day of 
-....l.Ar-'1'-'----1 ______ , 191 
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